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dealers a substantial period of notice before termination.83 To prevent
avoidance of the statute, it would be necessary to provide further that
during the entire period of the franchise relationship, including the notice
period, the manufacturer must deal in good faith. Good faith should be
defined and limited to the readiness of the manufacturer to deliver as
many cars in proportion to the number ordered as are provided to dealers
in similar territories both within and without the state.8" This is suffi-
ciently objective so that variation from the standard can be readily proved.
The express terms of the statute should give dealers a right to sue for
breach of good faith.8" If a dealer received notice of termination or if
he elected to terminate,8" he would have the opportunity to make a profit
during the notice period or the equivalent in damages. This scheme87 gives
the dealer a chance to liquidate or convert his investment and make ar-
rangements for a new enterprise. It removes the fear of imminent termi-
nation, yet leaves the producer free to adjust his sales organization as he
sees fit with a minimum of restriction.
VALIDITY OF MINIMUM WAGE DETERMINATIONS AND A
CONSIDERATION OF THE NEED FOR THE WALSH-HEALY ACT
The Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act,1 enacted in 1936, gave the
Secretary of Labor power to prescribe minimum wages2 for industries
be achieved voluntarily. See the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 12, 1955, p. 3, col. 1.
83. The minimum period should be six months. Perhaps this is not long enough
because dealers usually make their profits in the first half of the model year; conse-
quently, if notice of cancellation were received at the end of the first six months of the
model year, there would be little opportunity for a profit during the notice period.
84. This would not require the manufacturer to deliver on all orders accepted from
the dealers, but it would require the manufacturers to treat each dealer equitably if total
orders received were in excess of ability to supply.
85. Under this good faith requirement the manufacturer would be liable to the
dealer for reducing shipments of cars as a means of coercing a dealer. The manufac-
turer could still terminate if he believed his policies would be better carried out by an-
other dealer.
86. The right to profits during the notice period would accrue to the dealer who
terminated only if the manufacturer failed to give his orders the same treatment ac-
corded other dealers' orders. He would also be entitled to damages for loss of profits
caused by a previous failure to similarly honor orders.
87. It would be necessary to phrase the statute so that the manufacturer could not
coerce the dealer to bargain away his rights. Similarly, it must be phrased so that the
dealer's right can not be lost by a term of the franchise agreement. Most franchises
provide for interpretation under the laws of Michigan; therefore, a state statute which
instructs the courts on interpretation can be avoided.
1. 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1952). The act bears the
names of the two Massachusetts congressmen who sponsored it.
2. Before the passage of the act, the Federal Government was in the untenable
position of urging the betterment of labor conditions, on the one hand, and of hamper-
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contracting to supply materials to the Government.3 He is given three
standards upon which to base his determinations: ". . . prevailing mini-
mum wages for persons employed on similar work or in the particular
or similar industries or groups of industries currently operating in the
locality.. "' This power has been the subject of recent attack in the
federal courts by industries which claim that the Secretary, in setting
industry-wide minimum wages, has violated the standards set by the
ing the improvement of labor conditions by a requirement that its own supply contracts
be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, on the other. See 12 STAT. 220 (1861), as
amended, 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1952). The lowest responsible bidder requirement was an out-
growth of judicial and executive construction. See Scott v. U.S., 44 Ct. Cl. 524 (1909).
The statute was enacted as a stop-gap economic measure in a depression economy,
because Congress had been stymied by the Supreme Court's invalidation of more com-
prehensive labor standards legislation. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295
U.S. 495 (1935). In 1923, the Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional a District
of Columbia law providing for the fixing of minimum wages for women and children.
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
Government regulation of labor conditions through its contracts was not an innova-
tion of the Walsh-Healey Act. By statute Congress had fixed conditions in contracts
awarded by the Navy, 5 STAT. 617 (1843), 34 U.S.C. § 561 (1928), and the Army, 23
STAT. 109 (1884), 10 U.S.C. § 1200 (1927). Congress passed various statutes which
cumulatively became known as the "Eight-Hour-Law," placing an eight-hour day ceil-
ing on work done on government contracts, 27 STAT. 340 (1892) ; 37 STAT. 347 (1912) ;
37 STAT. 726 (1913) ; 39 STAT. 1192 (1917) ; 54 STAT. 884 (1940); 62 STAT. 989 (1948),
40 U.S.C. §§ 321-26 (1952). On March 3, 1931, Congress enacted the Bacon-Davis Act,
giving the Secretary of Labor power to set minimum wages for laborers and mechanics
employed by contractors or subcontractors on federal government contracts for con-
struction or repair of public buildings or works. 46 STAT. 1494 (1931), as amended, 40
U.S.C. § 276a (1952). The constitutionality of this act was upheld in Gillioz v. Webb,
99 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1938).
3. The act provides that any contract thereunder exceeding $10,000 shall contain
the representations and stipulations that the contractor is the manufacturer of, or a regu-
lar dealer in, the materials used in the performance of the contract; that no person em-
ployed by the contractor in the performance of the contract shall be permitted to work
in excess of eight hours in any one day or in excess of forty hours in any one week;
that no male person under 16 years of age or female under 18 or convict labor will be
employed; and that no part of the contract will be performed under working conditions
which are unsanitary or hazardous or dangerous to the health and safety of employees.
49 STAT. 2036-37 (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1952). Furthermore, the act gives the Secre-
tary power to hold hearings and issue orders requiring attendance and testimony of wit-
nesses and production of evidence under oath in investigating a breach or violation. 49
STAT. 2038 (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 39 (1952). The President is authorized to suspend the
representations required by the act during a time of emergency. 54 STAT. 681 (1940),
41 U.S.C. § 40 (1952). The act does not apply to purchases of materials ". . . as may
usually be bought in the open market." 49 STAT. 2039 (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 43 (1952).
4. 49 STAT. 2036-37 (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 35(b) (1952). The act further provides
for the payment by the contractor of sums equal to the amount of underpayment of the
minimum wages as set by the Secretary and for a "blacklisting" of certain violators by
the Government, since " unless the Secretary of Labor otherwise recommends, no con-
tracts shall be awarded . . . until 3 years have elapsed from the date the Secretary of
Labor determines such breach to have occurred." 49 STAT. 2037-38 (1936), 41 U.S.C.
§§ 36-37 (1952). For an excellent discussion of these provisions and the adjudication of
disputes arising under them, see Gellhorn and Linfield, Administrative Adjudication of
Contract Disputes: The Walsh-Healy Act, 37 MIci. L. REv. 841 (1939).
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statute.' Subsequent legislation and economic development create grave
doubts of the necessity for a separate wage and hour statute for indus-
tries supplying materials through government con'tracts.6
The general purpose of the Walsh-Healy Act was to permit the
Government to refuse to deal with "sweat shop" contractors.' Its legis-
lative history' shows that Congress also intended to bolster consumer
purchasing power9 and to deter migration of industry from high to low
wage areas,'" and there is substantial evidence that it was to be a measure
for raising labor standards in American industry generally."
5. See discussion at pp. 250-54 infra.
6. See pp. 254-56 infra.
7. The House Report of the bill stated that its purpose was to require "... per-
sons having contracts with the Government to conform to certain labor conditions in the
performance of the contracts and thus to eliminate the practice under which the Govern-
ment is compelled to deal in the sweat shops." H.R. REP. No. 2946, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936).
8. The Walsh Bill, S. 3055, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), was introduced on June
14, 1935, and was passed by the Senate on August 12, 1935. The House did not act on
the bill during 1935; Representative Healy introduced his bill, H.R. 11554, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936), on March 2, 1936. The Walsh Bill was much broader in scope than
the subsequently adopted act, since, in effect, it would have required contractors to con-
form to the N.R.A. codes then in effect. The Healy Bill was referred to the House
Judiciary Committee which held extensive hearings (See Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Judiciary of the House Committee on Judiciary on H.R. 11554, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess., ser. 12, pt. 2 (1936)), but no affirmative action was taken by the full commit-
tee. As a result, an entirely new bill was drafted by the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary, which was reported on June 6, 1936, and passed by the House on June 18, 1936. It
passed the Senate without discussion on June 20, 1936, and was signed into law on June
30, 1936. "It is thus apparent that there was very little opportunity for expression of
considered opinion as to the meaning of the specific language of the Bill which was
enacted into law." Brief for Defendant, p. 68, Covington Mills v. Mitchell, 129 Fed.
Supp. 740 (D.D.C. 1955).
9. See H.R. REP. No. 2946, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). The Senate Report stated
that ". . . the insistence on such standards on projects financed . . . with Federal
funds should . . . encourage private industry voluntarily to adopt like standards in pri-
vate undertakings, thereby increasing purchasing power and improving the general con-
dition of our citizens." S. REP. No. 1157, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1935). Various state-
ments were made in Congress that Government should not do business with those who
"... would break down our high American standards . . ." of employment. 80 CONG.
REc. 10009 (1936).
10. Representative Citron pointed out that he was worried about firms moving to
other sections ". . . where they can take advantage of low-standard wages." Ibid.
Senator Walsh also showed concern since companies were moving to places where they
could pay ". . . one half the wages that are paid in localities where the labor organiza-
tions have been able to demand and exact a living wage." Hearings before the House
Judiciary Committee o1 S. 3055, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 12, pt. 1, 117 (1935).
11. The United States Supreme Court has commented on the purposes of the act in
only two opinions. In Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 507 (1942), the
Court made the broad statement that "its purpose is to use the leverage of the Govern-
ment's immense purchasing power to raise labor standards." In Perkins v. Lukens Steel
Co., 310 U.S. 113, 128 (1940), the Court pointed out that the act's purpose was ". . . to
obviate the possibility that any part of our tremendous national expenditures would go
to forces tending to depress wages and purchasing power and offending fair social
standards of employment."
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Pursuant to the act, the Secretary of Labor divided the United States
into six regions for the purpose of fixing a minimum wage for the steel
industry. 2 This determination was challenged in Lukens Steel Co. v.
Perkins"3 on the ground that the word "locality" could not embrace such
large geographic areas.'" The United States Supreme Court held that in
the absence of constitutional legislation recognizing that damage in con-
sequence of the Secretary's action was a source of standing to sue, the
steel companies had no legal remedy." Thus, until 1952, interested par-
ties had no right to judicial review of the determinations of minimum
wages under the act.
To overcome the effect of the Lukens Steel holding, Congress, in
In this statute the Government is using its contracts as instruments of social control.
The historical concept of "contract" involves the idea of consensual agreement between
two parties; the government contract in modern times falls outside this historical con-
cept. Rather than agreement to terms in the contract after bargaining on a basis of
equality, as a matter of fact, the terms are dictated by the Government and submitted
to by the industry which desires to obtain the contract. This unequal position of the
Government and the contracting industry enables the Government to prescribe minimum
standards of labor conditions for industries which contract to supply materials. "The
relationship between the parties, thus, is often one of power, not contract in its tradi-
tional sense." Miller, Administrative Discretion in the Award of Federal Contracts, 53
MicH. L. REV. 781, 782 (1955). See also, Miller, Government Contracts and Social Con-
trol, 41 VA. L. REV. 27 (1955).
12. The Secretary initiates the wage determination process by inviting representa-
tives of employers and employees in the industry to be affected, who form an advisory
panel, to discuss with the Department of Labor the questions pertinent to the wage de-
termination. Thereafter, the panel meets to discuss matters relating to the definition of
the industry, methods of gathering wage data, and a time for a public hearing. Then a
wage survey is made either by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, trade unions, trade as-
sociations, or a combination of these. Following this the Secretary publishes notice of
the hearings in the Federal Register. The hearings are held before the Secretary or a
hearing examiner, who may subpoena witnesses or documents. After the hearings, the
experts of the Department's Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Divisions make their
confidential recommendations to the Secretary. On the basis of these recommendations,
the Secretary proposes a wage determination which is published in the Federal Register.
All interested persons then have 15 days in which to object to the proposed determina-
tion, and at the end of this time the Secretary issues a final minimum wage determina-
tion which takes effect not less than 30 days after the publication. 41 C.F.R. § 203,
Sub-part C (Supp. Jan. 1955).
13. 107 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1939), rev'd, 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
14. The Court of Appeals held that the lumping together of so many states as a
"locality" was a violation of the statutory mandate. The court stated that the Secre-
tary's construction went ". . . so far beyond any possible proper application of the
word as to defeat its meaning and to constitute an attempt arbitrarily to disregard the
statutory mandate." 107 F.2d 627, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
15. The Court based its decision on the unrealistic and debateable conclusion that
the Walsh-Healy Act ". . . does not represent an exercise by Congress of regulatory
power over private business or employment. In this legislation Congress did no more
than instruct its agents who were selected and granted final authority to fix the terms
and conditions under which the Government will permit goods to be sold to it." Perkins
v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 128-29 (1940).
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1952, passed the Fulbright Amendment16 to the act. As originally con-
ceived, the amendment not only would have granted a right to have the
Secretary's wage dterminations reviewed in the courts, but also would
have changed the "locality" section of the act to require the Secretary to
determine minimum wages on a city or town basis,'" The section designed
to change the "locality" language of the act was abandoned by the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency. 8 The adopted amendment, a
product of several compromises between southern and northern senators, 9
offered the Secretary no legislative definition or direction and made only
a subtle plea to the federal courts to correct any arbitrary abuse of the
power to set minimum wages under the act."
16. 66 STAT. 308 (1952), 41 U.S.C. § 43a (1952). The amendment, a rider to the
Defense Production Act of 1952, became Section 10 of the Walsh-Healy Act, and pro-
vides:
"a. Notwithstanding any provision of section 4 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, such Act shall be applicable in the administration of sections 1 to 5 and 7 to 9 of
this Act.
"b. All wage determinations under section 1(b) of this Act shall be made on the
record after opportunity for a hearing. Review of any such wage determination, or of
the applicability of any such wage determination, may be had within ninety days after
such determination is made in the manner provided in section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act by any person adversely affected or aggrieved thereby, who shall be
deemed to include any manufacturer of, or regular dealer in, materials, supplies, articles
or equipment purchased or to be purchased by the Government from any source, who is
in any industry to which such wage determination is applicable.
"c. Notwithstanding the inclusion of any stipulations required by any provision of
this Act in any contract subject to this Act, any interested person shall have the right
of judicial review of any legal question which might otherwise be raised, including, but
not limited to, wage determinations and the interpretations of the terms 'locality', 'regu-
lar dealer', 'manufacturer', and 'open market'."
17. This clause of the proposed amendment would have changed the language to
read ". . . city, town, village or other civil subdivision in which the materials, supplies,
articles, or equipment are to be manufactured or furnished under said contract .
98 CONG. REc. 4128 (1952).
18. The Senate Report pointed out that the committee "... considered, and re-
jected, a proposal to change the word 'locality,' in section 1 (b) of the act to 'city, town,
village, or other civil subdivision' . . . which was subsequently modified to read 'local
labor market area,' in order to include workers in a normal commuting area surrounding
the place of manufacture, and avoid the artificial boundaries of a city, town, or county."
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, p. 1821 (Vol. 2, 1952).
19. The minority report of the committee pointed out that the amendment was
. predicated, in part, on the theory that it will enhance the industrialization of one
section: The South. To us, this is not, and should not be, a sectional issue." Id. at
1836, Senator Fulbright stated that "the amendment I now have called up is . . . in
the nature of a compromise. . . . In offering this amendment, I do so with the under-
standing that [various Northern Senators] will withdraw their amendment, which pro-
poses to strike out the entire committee amendment. I also understand that they will
support the amendment I have offered." 98 CONG. REc. 6529 (1952).
20. As a result of the Fulbright Amendment, the Secretary had published in the
Federal Register the "Rules of Procedure" to be followed in the determination proce-
dure. 17 F.R. 7944, August 30, 1952, reprinted in 41 C.F.R. § 203 Sub-part C (Supp.
Jan. 1955). However, even before the publication in the Federal Register, the Secretary
adhered to a determination procedure which was in general conformance with Section 4
of the Administrative Procedure Act. See The Walsh Healey Public Contracts Act, 12
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After passage of the Fulbright Amendment, the textile industries
quickly filed for injunctive relief and a stay of the Secretary's wage
determinations for their industries.2 The companies objected to the
Secretary's interpretation of the "locality" language of the statute to
allow minimum wage determinations on an industry-wide basis. 22 The
Secretary argues that to fix minimum wages on a local community basis
would only foster the "sweat shop" labor which the Walsh-Healy Act
intended to eliminate from consideration in the award of government
N.A.M. LAw DIGEST 25, 35 (1950). The procedural requirements of the A.P.A. could
not have been invoked against the Secretary prior to the amendment, since Section 4 of
the A.P.A. exempted matters relating to public contracts from its rule-making provi-
sions. Under the A.P.A. the Secretary in his administration of the act is subject to cer-
tain minimum procedural requirements applicable to executive agencies generally in
their exercise of rule-making powers: for example, adequate notice of proposed rule
making, opportunity for interested persons to participate in the rule-making process, and
right of interested persons to petition for repeal of a rule.
21. The cotton textile cases, Covington Mills v. Mitchell and Alabama Mills v.
Mitchell were combined and heard by the district court in Covington Mills v. Mitchell,
129 Fed. Supp. 740 (D.D.C. 1955). The Woolen and Worsted textile case is Allendale
Co. v. Mitchell, Civil No. 1630-54 (D.D.C. 1955). These cases arose from hearings and
proposed changes of the minimum wage by the Secretary for those industries in 1952.
On January 23, 1952, a petition was filed by a union for a revision of the 1948 deter-
mination of the prevailing minimum wage in the cotton textile industry. Hearings were
held in September of 1952. On the basis of those hearings and wage surveys, the Secre-
tary proposed to raise the minimum wage from 87 cents to $1.00 per hour. See Brief
for Defendant, pp. 1-2, Covington Mills v. Mitchell, 129 Fed. Supp. 740 (D.D.C. 1955).
Hearing was held for the purpose of considering the possible minimum wage re-deter-
mination in the Woolen and Worsted Industry on May 19, 1952, which resulted in a pro-
posed raise from $1.05 to $1.20 per hour in the Broad-Woven Goods, Yarn and Thread
Branch of that industry on January 30, 1954. See Brief for Plaintiffs, p. 3, Allendale
Co. v. Mitchell, Civil No. 1630-54 (D.D.C. 1955), September 30, 1955.
22. The complaining companies contend that the grammatical structure of the act
shows that the "locality" language modifies all of the three standards offered. They
point out that it is ". . . grammatically natural to speak of 'similar work . . . in the
locality.'" As to "particular or similar industries," the companies state that even the
Secretary admits that this phrase is aptly referred to by the phrase "currently operating
in the locality." Brief for Appellees, pp. 22-23, Mitchell v. Covington Mills, Appeal
Docketed, No. 12650 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Secondly, the companies, relying on statements
made in the legislative history of the act, assert that Congress intended the "locality"
language to modify all three standards. For example, Representative Healy made the
statement that ". . . this bill merely provides that the Government shall have the right
to refuse bids . . . to those . . . who pay less than the prevailing rate of wages in
their community. . . " 80 CONG. REc. 10002 (1936).
The companies state that the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Lukens Steel
case should be controlling in the present action, because the Supreme Court did not re-
verse the Court of Appeals on the merits of the case. "(S)ince that decision establishes
that the defendant has no power to make wage determinations under the Act for multi-
state regions, a fortiori, the defendant has no power to make determinations on a nation-
wide basis." Brief for Plaintiffs, p. 14, Allendale Co. v. Mitchell, op. cit. supra, note 21.
The companies also assert that under no interpretation of the word "locality" could it be
held to allow determinations on a natoin-wide basis. The Secretary's " . . contention
would portray Congress as an incompetent fumbler in its wording of the Act and as
haphazardly using a term 'locality,' completely inappropriate to the purpose which it had
in mind." Brief for Appellees, Mitchell v. Covington Mills, supra at 36.
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contracts.23 Therefore, he utilizes geographical differentials only when
the wage surveys for a particular industry show that such differentials
should be established. 4
The district court sustained the contentions of the complaining com-
panies in Covingtolt Mills v. Mitchell,2 holding that the phrase "currently
23. The Secretary defends his interpretation on the ground that the "locality"
language modifies only the last of the three standards which the act offers. "The literal
terms of Section 1 (b), when read naturally and grammatically, seem plainly to authorize
the Secretary to determine the prevailing minimum wages on either one or more of three
bases: For persons employed (1) 'on similar work' or (2) 'in the particular or similar
industries' or (3) in 'groups of industries currently operating in the locality'. ... "
Brief for Defendant, p. 44, Covington Mills v. Mitchell, op. cit. supra, note 21. Secondly,
he is also supported by more than 19 years of administrative practice and legislative ac-
ceptance. "If the Congress which had passed the Walsh-Healy Act had, in fact, intended
to limit the scope of its wage determinations to particular communities or groups of
counties, it would hardly have remained passive after being made aware of such extreme
divergence from this concept as the Secretary's early industry-wide determinations repre-
sent." Id. at 48. The Secretary contends that the present interpretation of the "locality"
language is the one most consistent with the legislative purposes of the act and argues
that the word "locality," in any event, is sufficiently flexible in the context in which it
is used to include industry-wide determinations. "In the instant case, we are concerned
with a term which not only has no 'plain meaning,' but which if given a rigid meaning
would produce both absurd and unreasonable results 'plainly at variance with the policy
of the legislation as a whole.'" Id. at 64.
24. The Department of Labor proceeds in the first instance "....without regard
to locality but with the objective of the Public Contracts Act before us. We assume
that although the finding of prevailing minimum wages by locality is not a mandatory
provision of the Act, geographical differentials may or may not be established according
as the wage data in each industry indicate or not [sic.] that such differentials should be
established." STRACKBEIN, THE PREVAILING MINIMUM WAGE STANDARD, 76-77 (1939).
Unlike the Fair Labor Standards Act, which establishes a statutory minimum wage, the
Walsh-Healey Act give the Secretary discretion to find what the prevailing minimum
wage for an industry is and then to establish that wage as the minimum for -laborers in
that industry working on materials to be supplied under government contracts. No spe-
cific ceiling is established by the law, and the wage provisions the Secretary establishes
do not apply retroactively.
The determinations by the Secretary, on the basis of the information gathered
through the wage surveys and the hearings, generally are based on one or a combination
of the following statistical theories: (1) The "Cluster" Theory. On the basis of the
wage surveys of a particular industry, the Secretary breaks down the earnings of em-
ployees into 5-cent intervals. The Secretary then sets as the prevailing minimum wage
that interval in the lower part of the wage structure which has a higher percentage of
employees in it than in the interval either above or below it. (2) The "Union Con-
tracts" Theory. In cases where the industry is highly organized, the Secretary some-
times utilizes the rates established in the labor contracts for common labor as the pre-
vailing minimum. (3) The "Majority of Employees" Theory. Emphasis is laid by the
Department in this statistical theory on the wages paid by half or more of the plants in
the industry which employ half or more of the employees in the industry. For comment
and criticism of these theories see, VAN SICKLE, THE WALSiE:-HEALEY PUBLIC CON-
TRACTS ACT, 13-16, No. 445 "National Economic Problems Series," American Enterprise
Association, (1952) and LABOR LEGISLATION COMMITTEE OF RADIO-ELECTRONIcS-TELEVI-
SION-MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, THE WALsH-HEALEY ACT: THE LABOR LAW THAT
REALLY NEEDS REVISION, 26-35 (1954).
25. 129 Fed. Supp. 740 (D.D.C. 1955). The Covington Mills case and the Alabama
Mills case were heard together before Judge Holtzoff, District Judge of the D.C. Dis-
trict Court on April 4, 1955; the Allendale Co. case is pending before this same district
court. Before the publication of this issue of the INDIANA LAw JOURNAL the Court of
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operating in the locality" limits all three of the available standards for
setting the prevailing minimum wage.2 ' The court was especially influ-
enced by the fact that in the Lukens Steel case the Department of Labor
did not advance the idea that the phrase modified only the last standard.
Conceding that the term "locality" is an indefinite word, and a great deal
of discretion is granted the Secretary in defining it, the court neverthe-
less concluded that regarding the entire United States as a "locality"
distorts the meaning of the word.28
It appears that the district court achieved results which differ little
from those which would have been reached had the isolated paragraph
from the act been interpreted by a professor of English grammar. In
essence, the court jettisoned any consideration of the legislative purposes
of the act and the administrative history of its interpretation and con-
sidered only the literal language of the paragraph it isolated from the
act.29 The construction of the Walsh-Healy Act should not, however,
rest solely upon its grammatical structure, on the inclusion or omission
of a comma,"0 nor upon the isolated remarks of congressmen concerning
Appeals of the D.C. Circuit reversed the holding of the district court in the Covington
Mills case. Mitchell v. Covington Mills, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 1081, 2239 (C.A.D.C. Dec. 1,
1955). The court of appeals sustained the thesis of this note in holding that the district
court's interpretation would defeat the purposes of the Walsh-Healey Act. In holding
that the Secretary could fix industry-wide minimum wages, the court pointed out that
the "locality" language does not appear to modify all the standards the act gives the
Secretary for setting minimum wages and that Congress by its inaction "... has chosen
to leave the interpretation of the Act to the Secretary and the courts."
26. The court admitted that ". . . it is, perhaps, an unfortunate choice of words,
but . . . this is the interpretation, in the opinion of this Court, which should be ac-
corded to those words." Id. at 741.
27. The court pointed out that in the Lukens Steel case "... it seemed to be as-
sumed that the words . . .were applicable to and limited each of the three alternatives."
Ibid.
28. The court stated that it was "... impelled to this conclusion . . ." by the
opinion of the Court of Appeals in the Lukens Steel case. "A fortiori, if fourteen
states is too large an area to be deemed a single locality, it necessarily follows that the
United States of America is much too large an area to be so considered." Id. at 742.
The court further held that the arguments made by the Secretary regarding the adminis-
trative difficulty and the social and economic desirability of fixing the rate on a nation-
wide basis were impressive, but that these arguments should be directed to the legisla-
ture and not to the court. Id. at 743.
29. This was a prevalent criticism of the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the
Lukens Steel case. "The court in the instant case tears the term 'locality' from the con-
text of the Act. . . . The court's definition of 'locality' discloses either a failure to
recognize the purpose of the Act or an unrealistic conception of the steel industry ...
The restricted definition of 'locality' in the Lukens Steel decision is thus objectionable,
since it preserves the status quo of manufacturers in geographically isolated centers,
permits the destructive competition to continue as a depressant on labor conditions, and,
consequently, impairs the corrective purposes of the Act." Note, 49 YALE L.J. 548, 550-
51 (1940).
30. From a grammarian's point of view, the Secretary has made a tenable inter-
pretation of the act's standards. No comma separates the phrase "currently operating in
the locality" from the last alternative offered by the act, so as to show that the phrase
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the meaning of the "locality" language.3 It is submitted that the act's
standards should be construed in light of its basic legislative purposes,
about which the parties are in general agreement.
For almost two decades the act has been administered according to
the Secretary's interpretation without legislative expression of disap-
proval. If this interpretation has offended the construction which Con-
gress wished placed upon the standards, there has been considerable
opportunity to force a change; it seems that by its inaction Congress
approved that interpretation. The fact that the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency expressly refused to adopt an amendment32 which
would have required the Secretary to accept the view of the complaining
companies lends additional weight to the proposition that the Secretary's.
interpretation should be upheld by the courts.
Of primary importance is the fact that the Secretary's interpretation
could fulfill the legislative purposes of the act, while the contrary view
urged by the complaining companies would only subvert those purposes.
Should the minimum wage determination be made on a city or community
basis the Government would be forced to deal with "sweat shop" con-
tractors if "sweat shop" wages were prevailing in that community. On
the other hand, by setting nation-wide minimum wages the Secretary is
able to require contractors in those areas where "sweat shop" labor might
exist either to raise the level of their wages or to refrain from bidding on
government contracts. Various sponsors of the act believed that the
Walsh-Healy Act could prevent the migration of industry from high to
low level areas. The companies' construction of the standards would make
this impossible, since minimum wage determinations on a community
basis would not alter existing wage differentials in the various sections
of the country. Furthermore, minimum wages set on a local community
basis would only foster the low wages existing in the area, thereby
thwarting Congress' purpose of raising labor standards in industry gen-
erally.
is meant to modify the previous two alternatives also.
31. These statements should not be credited too highly, because most of them were
not directed toward a consideration of the "locality" language itself; the bill, as finally
adopted, differed in language from those being discussed in a majority of the debate;
and the final language of the act was a result of compromise, rather than sustained leg-
islative purpose. The Secretary of Labor admits that ". . . unquestionably, some of
the views expressed by the individual proponents and opponents of the legislation, in
various stages of its draftsmanship, suggest a limited view of the 'locality' language."
He goes on to point out, however, that ". . there were just as many expressions of
intent for the broader construction. The legislative history as a whole, in relation to
this particular language, is admittedly somewhat confused and inconclusive ... " Brief
for Defendant, p. 66, Covington Mills v. Mitchell, op. cit. supra, note 21.
32. See note 17 supra.
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Although the Secretary's interpretation of the standards will carry
out congressional purposes, there are valid reasons why the Walsh-Healy
Act is no longer needed. It is true that, if the complaining companies
position is upheld by the courts, these purposes could not be accomplished
and the statute's administration necessarily would be curtailed; the dis-
continuance of the administration of this outdated law, however, would
more properly be brought about by congressional, rather than judicial,
action.
Less than two years after the passage of the Walsh-Healy Act,
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act,"3 a more comprehensive
labor standards statute. 4 The administration of both acts has been com-
bined in the Department of Labor under one administrator. The two
acts are not mutually exclusive ;5 thus, FLSA may apply to companies
receiving government contracts, even though the contractor is also cov-
ered by the Walsh-Healy Act. Because FLSA seeks to raise wage levels
generally and applies to the great majority of contractors covered by the
Secretary's determinations, 6 it is clear that the Government would not
be forced to deal with "sweat shop" labor, even if the Walsh-Healy Act
were repealed. It seems that there is no longer any need for the Walsh-
Healy Act.
When the actual operation of the Walsh-Healy Act is considered, 7
33. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1952).
34. The act applies to employees of industries engaged in interstate commerce or in
the production of goods for interstate commerce. The Supreme Court upheld the ex-
ercise of the power under the commerce clause in U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940).
The Court also held that the act did not violate the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
35. Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1950). See Note, 99 U. PA. L.R.
255 (1950).
36. Stuart Rothman, Solicitor of Labor, in a letter to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL,
October 31, 1955, pointed out that "... wherever the Walsh-Healey Act applies, we
generally find that the Fair Labor Standards Act also applies because practically all
production for the Government involves transportation of the product across State
boundaries."
37. The effect of the Secretary's determinations upon the wages in the affected
industries is difficult, if not impossible, to measure statistically. The Department of
Labor has no information indicating the effects of the determinations. In some cases,
plants which pay lower than the minimum wage do not bid on federal contracts, and
thus are unaffected by the minimum wage set by the Secretary. In other cases, the in-
flationary economy of the United States in recent years has pushed wages up so far that
the actual prevailing minimum wage is far above the established minimum of the Secre-
tary. A prime example of an industry where wages are far above the standard is the
iron and steel industry. "(T)he minimum wage in the basic iron and steel industry is
so far above the minimum wage required under the Walsh-Healey Act, it is doubtful
whether the Act has had any impact on the wage structure or wage level in the steel
industry." Letter from Leo Teplow, Industrial Relations Consultant of the American
Iron and Steel Institute, New York, N.Y., to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL, October 3,
1955. In the paper and pulp industry, for which the Secretary plans to redetermine the
prevailing minimum wage, ". . . the effect will be of an academic nature in light of the
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it is evident that very little is accomplished which would not be effectu-
ated under FLSA standing alone. When the FLSA rate was raised to
75 cents in 1949, the Secretary of Labor increased all minimum wage
rates which were under 75 cents to conform to the FLSA statutory mini-
mum. At the present time, 28 of the 43 determinations of the Secretary
are identical with the FLSA minimum of 75 cents."8 The minimum wage
rate of FLSA will be $1.00 per hour after March 1, 1956;"9 if present
determinations are continued, only seven industries will have a determina-
tion under Walsh-Healy which is higher than the FLSA minimum after
that date. These few determinations do not present a compelling case for
a separate wage and hour statute for government contractors.
Two wage and hour statutes applying simultaneously to many in-
dustries cause confusion, unnecessary cost, and a duplication in obligations
and liabilities under the acts."° The requirements of the two acts are
sufficiently different that industries need to keep double records, result-
ing in confusion and increased expense. The Department of Labor, in
administering the two acts, must maintain a larger staff at a greater cost
to the taxpayer.
The Walsh-Healy Act has not, apparently, influenced the migration
of industry from one section of the country to another. Recent studies 1
indicate that the labor market is not the most significant reason for in-
dustry moving from New England to the South. More important reasons
seem to be availability of materials and closeness to the market." The
existing wage scales in the industry." Letter from George V. Johnson, Secretary, In-
dustrial Relations Committee, American Paper and Pulp Association, New York, N.Y.,
to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL, September 29, 1955.
38. Wage and Hour and Pub!ic Contracts Divisions, Summary of Minimum Wage
Determinations, PC-14, December, 1954.
39. 69 STAT. 711, August 12, 1955.
40. "The inevitable result of the co-existence of these two statutes has been con-
fusion, overlapping and duplication since almost all employers performing government
contracts are subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act." The Walsh-Healey Public
Contracts Act, 12 N.A.M. LAW DIGEST 25, 37 (1950). "Both business administration
and government operations would be simplified if there were one rather than two federal
laws, inconsistent in some aspects, dealing with the subject of minimum wage and hours
worked." Letter from Leo Teplow to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL, op. cit. sutpra, note
36. "The Walsh-Healey Act is an unnecessary burden on industry, involving onerous
record keeping, high administrative costs, and subtle in its use to effect results which
should be the matter of collective bargaining." Letter from George V. Johnson to the
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL, op. cit. supra, note 36.
41. See, NATIONAL PLANNING COMMITTEE OF THE SOUTH, REPORT No. 1, NEW IN-
DUSTRY COMES TO THE SOUTH (1949) and McLAUGHLIN AND ROBUCK, WHY INDUSTRY
MovEs SOUTH (1949).
42. "Of new plants covered by the study, it turned out that companies that located
in the South primarily to be close to the market accounted for 45 percent of the total
number. Plants that were drawn mainly by the availability of materials represented 30
percent of the total and the South's labor supply was the chief reason for the location
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surveys further show that the wage differential was only one of several
attractive features of the southern labor market which cause industry to
move.43 The surveys point out that the wage differentials for similar
sized communities in the North and South have been narrowing since
World War II, and in some plants wages have become higher in the
South than in the North. The studies also show that the wage differen-
tial is expected to narrow still more and probably disappear." Thus,
there is no reason to continue the Walsh-Healy Act in operation to ac-
complish Congress' purpose in this respect.
It appears that the act has become of little value in maintaining
consumer purchasing power. The act was passed during the period of
recovery from the depression, when there was an urgent need to stimu-
late higher wages in order to put more money into the economy and thus
battle the effect of the depression. Today's inflated economy has elimi-
nated the need for the accomplishment of this purpose of the act. More-
over, the act is being used in some instances to aid trade unions in their
attempts to achieve the union wage in all plants.' The fact that the
Secretary applies the "Union Contracts" theory46 in determining wages
in certain industries shows that this use has had some influence on de-
partmental procedure. The Walsh-Healy Act was not intended to serve
this purpose.
In conclusion, although the present procedure of the Secretary of
Labor in determining minimum wages under the Walsh-Healy Act
should be upheld by the federal courts as a valid exercise of administra-
tive discretion in carrying out the purposes which Congress intended,
there is no existing need for the accomplishment of these purposes
through the Walsh-Healy Act. Since the effectuating of congressional
of 25 percent of the plants.... ".NATIONAL PLANNING COMMITTEE OF THE SOUTH,
REPORT No. 1, Id. at 4.
43. "With few exceptions, these companies that are paying lower wages in their
southern than in their northern plants told the committee that they would not have
risked their funds in a new southern location simply because of the wage scale dif-
ferences. They considered these differences only temporary. What they were primarily
interested in were lower labor costs-less labor turnover and absenteeism with greater
opportunity of operations-not chiefly cheap labor. Id. at 18. Contra, Wecht, The
Walsh-Healey "Locality" Problem, 4 LABOR L.J. 399, 401 (1953).
44. McLAUGHLIN and RoBUCK, op. cit. supra, note 41 at 70. The companies
pointed out to the committee that they couldn't justify a large investment founded on
such an uncertain matter as a North-South wage differential.
45. "In the ten determinations made in the three year period 1948-50 the initiative
was taken only once by the Department of Labor. In the other nine cases the request
came from a union." VAN SICKLE, op. cit. supra, note 24 at 9. "In the ten determina-
tions made in the three year period 1948-50. . . . in six of these cases the Union made
the wage survey; in one it shared the task with the Bureau of Labor Statistics ..
Ibid.
46. See note 24 supra.
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purposes through two wage and hour laws is an unnecessary duplication,
it would be advisable for Congress to repeal the Walsh-Healy Act. To
provide for those infrequent cases where the materials supplied under
government contracts might not be introduced into interstate commerce,
a stipulation in the Fair Labor Standards Act to the effect that its mini-
mum wage and other standards of labor conditions shall apply to manu-
facturers supplying materials under public contract would accomplish
these purposes just as effectively and would eliminate duplication and
administrative difficulty as well.
POSTAL SANCTIONS: A STUDY OF THE SUMMARY USE OFADMINISTRATIVE POWER
To protect the general public from certain undesirable activities,
Congress has delegated to the Postmaster General responsibility for regu-
lating and supervising the flow of material through the channels of the
United States mail.' Power to carry out this responsibility rests in statu-
1. The Constitution empowers Congress to legislate concerning post offices and
post roads. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Initially, Congress considered this power
limited strictly to providing for a physical expansion of the embryonic department and
its services necessary to meet the needs of a rapidly growing nation. RICH, THE His-
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES POST OFFICE TO THE YEAR 1829, at 68-90 (1924). Even at
this stage the potential danger to free circulation of intelligence implicit in the power to
control use of the mails was a matter of congressional concern. There was strong
suspicion that the postal service had been used as a tool in an attempt to obstruct the
adoption of the Constitution. RICH, op. cit. supra at 65, 114-15. General distrust in the
use of administrative power, coupled with a firm belief that the regulation of mail con-
tent was not within the power of Congress, led to the defeat of President Jackson's
proposal to prohibit incendiary abolitionist publications from the mails. S. Doc. No. 118,
24th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1836). For debates on the issues, see 12 CONG. DEB. 26-34,
1123-34, 1722-36 (1836). The Post Office Department, however, chose to circumscribe
use of the mails on its own initiative, with the approval of the Attorney General. Yazoo
City Post Office Case (1857), 8 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 489 (1853-1857) ; Case of Emory &
Co. (1860), 9 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 454 (1857-1860). While this action met with criticism
sufficient to initiate a congressional inquiry, it was continued with the approval of both
houses of Congress. H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 16, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1863); S. Doc.
No. 19, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1863).
The exigencies of the Civil War apparently dulled the keen edge of opposition
shown a generation earlier to controlling expression by regulating use of the mails, for
the Reconstruction Congress had little difficulty in adopting a statute prohibiting the
transmission of obscenity through the mails. 13 STAT. 507 (1865). A flood of similar
legislation followed. 15 STAT. 196 (1868) (lottery); 17 STAT. 283 (1872) (codifying
existing postal laws, prohibiting use of the mails to defraud, mailing matter physically
dangerous to the postal service, obscene matter, material or information concerned with
contraception, and lottery information and equipment); 25 STAT. 496 (1888) (defama-
tory matter) ; 39 STAT. 1069 (1917) (liquor advertising) (later repealed by 48 STAT. 316
(1934) ; Securities Act, 48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1952) ; Securities and Ex-
change Act, 48 STAT. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1952) ; Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act, 49 STAT. 812 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79d (2) (1952) (use of the mails by per-
sons not registered under these acts).
